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ABSTRACT
A comparison is performed of battlefield effects of 3x8 field artillery cannon battal-
ions using two different methods of employing battery fires. Battles conducted at the
National Training Center are used as a basis for developing scenarios for analysis. The
NTC Livefire OPFOR is replicated in Janus, and artillery missions from actual battles
are fired against it. The two methods of artillery employment are platoon fires and
battery fires. A statistical analysis is performed on the results, and the operational im-
plications are presented. The findings indicate that the method of employing batteries,
a unified battery versus independent platoons, does influence the number of kills ob-
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1. INTRODUCTION
There has been a recently expressed concern within the Army about a possible de-
crease in the battlefield effects of field artillery battalions observed in training at the
National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. This thesis addresses one possible
argument involved in the issue, by using the Janus combat simulation model to replicate
portions of battles conducted for training. Two different methods of employing artillery
fires are evaluated in the Janus model, using ten actual battle scenarios from the Na-
tional Training Center. Analysis of Variance techniques are applied to two different
methods of employment, and the results are analyzed for statistical significance, as well
as the implied operational significance.
During the last decade, the force structure of the Armor and Mechanized Infantry
Divisions in the United States Army has undergone several changes, some prominent,
some subtle. Many of the changes have been a product of the "Division 86" (later,
"Army of Excellence") revamp of Army Heavy Division force structure. One of the less
noticeable, though certainly significant, of these changes was the addition of six more
self-propelled howitzers into each of the three Direct Supportl artillery battalions of the
Division Artillery. Not a costly or seemingly dramatic change, this upgrade was moti-
vated by the need to provide battlefield commanders with increased firepower, which had
been determincd to be lacking. Within each battalion, these six howitzers were not in-
troduced as a single, additional battery, but rather were distributed among the three ex-
isting batteries, up-gunning them from six to eight guns each--thus creating the "3x8"
battalion. The rationale for this force structure (vice a fourth battery) was that the only
costs incurred would be those of the additional howitzers' equipment and personnel.
The "overhead" costs associated with forming another battery would be avoided. The
proposal, along with the supporting analysis, appeared solid; no one anticipated the
repercussions that were soon to appear.
I A tactical mission assignment in which the field artillery battalion is immediately subordinate
to the maneuver commander, usually at the brigade level. In this role, the artillery battalion be-
comes an integral part of the maneuver force, and is highly responsive to the maneuver
commander's needs. In contrast, other standard tactical missions arc General Support (GS), Re-
inforcing (R), and General Support-Reinforcing (GSR).
In 1986, the first units which had transitioned to 3x8 (within CONUS2) began ro-
tating with their associated maneuver brigades to the National Training Center (NTC)
at Fort Irwin, California. Everyone in the Land Combat arena was anxious to witness
the increased firepower and responsiveness that the new organization would provide.
But dramatic increases were not seen. That could be considered normal; any newly im-
plemented doctrine requires time to mature, and there was no immediate expression of
concern. But as more units transitioned to 3x8 and conducted routine training at the
NTC, dramatic increases still did not appear. In fact, after more than two years of ob-
servation, it was becoming apparent that something was very wrong. But explanations
were elusive. Reluctantly, the NTC Artillery Observation Team3 admitted that not only
were increases not observed, but there was actually a decrease in the observed effective-
ness of artillery during battles witnessed at NTC! This was not good news, and there
was now reason for concern.
2 Continental United States
3 The Observer, Controllers who observe artillery units at the NIC are part of the NTC Fire
Support Operations Group; for the purpose of clarity in this report, the term "Artillery Observation
Team" will be used to indicate these people
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II. OBJECTIVE
The problem addressed by this research is the recent observed trend of decreased
artillery effectiveness at the National Training Center. The issue itself is surrounded by
controversy. The observations have come from personnel at the National Training
Center, who are rightly considered experts in their areas. There have been on-going
analyses, discussions, and proposed solutions in terms of many subjective factors in-
volved, but resources at the NTC are not available to conduct extensive quantitative
analyses. Therefore, this research was conducted with the cooperation and mutual in-
terest of personnel at the NTC.
The purpose of this research is to provide some form of quantitative analysis to aid
in confronting the issue of battlefield effectiveness of 3x8 battalions. A large portion of
the effort was devoted to defining and refining the problem statement, and designing a
methodology which would be plausible from both a statistical and an operational point
of view. The following chapters are devoted to explaining how the issue was refined, and
how a new methodology was engineered in order to attack an underlying premise of the
NTC Artillery Observation Team personnel. It is necessary to first understand the
source of the issue, and what possible causal relationships exist. It is also desirable to
review existing analyses, to understand what has been done so far. With this back-
ground, the model is proposed along with its output, and the results are then analyzed
in the context of operational significance to the current Army force.
Il1. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM FOCUS
A. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The modernized battalion force structure, consisting of three batteries with eight
howitzers each, was designed to provide increased firepower in an era of resource con-
straints. The Army's Threat Area Analyses of the mid and late 1970's looked toward the
then current and future threats of the post-Vietnam world, and projected critical weak.
nesses of the future force of the 1990's. These analyses exposed a lack of immediately
responsive, organic (within the division) firepower available to commanders at the divi-
sion and brigade levels. That is, although there existed adequate firepower resources
within the Corps and Theater levels (which would be used to augment and support the
forward maneuver forces), there was a lack of artillery and other "force multipliers" that
were under the immediate authority of division and especially brigade commanders. The
"Division 86" concept was the official Army response [Refl 1]. It was the plan and the
vehicle which would upgrade the then current forces into better equipped and more
powerful combat Divisions by 1986. "Division 86", however, was too optimistic, failing
to realize resource limitations. It was soon replaced by the "Army of Excellence" mod-
ernization plan [Ref. 2], which took over as the guiding document to force moderniza-
tion. The 3x8 concept had been originally incorporated in "Division 86", and was carried
over into the "Army of Excellence". By the mid-1980's, divisions were gradually, but
methodically, upgrading Tables of Organization and Equipment as they received per.
sonnel and equipment to implement the changes authorized.
The concept of 3xS battalions had been developed and proposed by the U.S. Army
Field Artillery School and Center in the late 1970's, in response to the stated need for
increased divisional firepower. A series of studies was commissioned to specifically an-
alyze alternatives for doing so. The "Legal Mix V" study [Ref. 3 ], which would become
the supporting document for 3x8 authorization, was a side-by-side comparison of five
of various combinations ("mixes") of artillery batteries comprising a battalion, with each
mix having a different organizational configuration. The five proposed mixes are shown
in Table 1 on page 5 . The Measures of Effectiveness (MOE's) in the evaluation were
based upon (1) battlefield effects and (2) survivability of the battalion in a simulated
high-intensity, western-European scenario. Each of these was divided by the incurred
cost for the respective mix, resulting in actual MOE's of marginal-gain-per-unit-cost.
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T'hough the ranked outcome of mnixcs was dii rrcut for each MOE, rnixes 2 and 3 were
very close, and ranking --- the top for both MOE's. Based upon this report, the Army
approved the Field Artillery's recommeindation to upgrade direct support battalions to
eight-gun batteries, adding two guns and also a second fire direction ccn tcr4 to each ex-
isting battery, but staying at only 3 batteries pcr battalion,
Table I. LEGAL MIX V VARIATIONS 
_____ 
_____
No. Batteries No. guns per No. Fire Unoits No. FDCs per
___________ per Battalion Battery 
________ Battery
Mi x 3 6 1 1_____
Mix 2 4 8 2 1_____
'.\ix 3 4 82 2
Mix 4 4 81 1_____
Mlix 5 5 J 6 1 ______
Theli initially proposed doctrine for 30S employment was not a radical departure From
the then-current operation,. procedures. Thec battery would still deploy, conduct fires,
and reposition as a single unit. The primiary difference was that the two platoons would
be physically separated in location by approximately 800-1600 nieters, which would
provide a significant advantage in survi~ability (Figure 1 onl page 0). T'lic second FDC
was envisioned to provide a back-up fire-direction capability to the battery, allowing
ieal-time battle hiand-off whon required. (Battle hand-off occurs whent thei primnary 1'DC
becomes non- functional, either through combat attrition or other catastrophic event.
Immediate, real-time hiand-off was virtually impossible under the old sy stein of mnanual
or hiand-hecld-calculator fire direction backup, a shortfall even before 3xS ).
As the first units transitioned to 3x8, this doctrine was followed. But what happened
next is not certain. Perhaps there was not a good understanding of the 3x8 employment
concept. Some would argue that the initial 3x8 guidance was unrealistic and contained
doctrinal contradictions. Perhaps leaders experimented with the design, to make up for
weaknesses they perceived in the structure. and to strengthen it For their own particular
4 TIhe lire Direction Center (FI)C) is the section of equipment and personniel responsible for
controllin-g firc,., at thle batter% level, this, includt-s computing all of the techoical data required by
*thle gunls, at the battalion lcoel, this usuallN entailN phuining schedules of firs, receiig fire mnission's
from observers, and routing missions to suboidinate units For execution.
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F',ure 1. 3x8 Field Artillery Battalion: As initially proposed; note each battery's
internal communications.
environment. In any case, as the modernization to 3x8 continued throughout the Army,
the tactical operating procedure of the converted units began to change.
The change taking place was subtle, however. It did not draw much attention in and
of itself. "Autonomous operations", which up until now had been associated with bat-
teries, was now being associated with platoons. The term had been coined earlier (about
a decade before) during the conversion to automated fire direction computers, and had
been defined as a battery operating under its own command and control authority (not
within the battalion computer network). The new meaning was analogous: autonomous
platoons operated independently, not under centralized battery control (Figure 2 on
page 7). Although the possibility of separate platoon operations had been recognized
and addressed in the 3x8 concept, it was not initially intended as a routine alternative.
But rapidly the concept of "autonomous platoon operations" was taking on a life of its
own. In early 1989, the concept was given official recognition by the Commandant of
the Field Artillery School [Ref. 4]. 'Autonomous platoons" were now legitimate.
It was during this same period that leadership and observers at the National Train-
ing Center were reporting that they observed decreased battlefield effects from artillery
units, and they tended to blame "3x8." Their reasons were myriad and diverse, ranging
from extremely technical to acutely subjective issues (discussed below). To their credit,
6
CDD
Figure 2. 3x8 Field Artillery Battalion: As the distances separating platoons
grew (to 3.5 km), "Autonomous Platoon Operations" took their own
course; laying communication wire between platoons was becoming in-
feasible.
they had already analyzed the more blatant causes, and were proposing solutions to the
artillery community, both through the artillery school and to the units in training. But
the artillery community itself was divided into those who recognized a problem, and
those who discredited it. There would be no easy solutions.
B. CURRENT SITUATION
Possible causes of the supposed decrease in artillery effectiveness are numerous and
interrelated. Some of the factors under suspicion are:
1. Lack of massing. Massing fires is one of the five basic tenets of Field A rtillery.
Obviously, if the units were operating as autonomous platoons, there was an
inverse effect upon massed fires. A primary argument of NTC personnel is
that this is precisely why the observed decrease in effects is so pronounced.
2. Command and control of fires. With the greater distances between platoons
(sometimes up to five kilometers!), more often than not the platoons of a same
battery do not have wire communications between them (Figure 2). This
means that units cannot exploit the quick massing capability afforded by the
FDC computer when there is direct FDC-to.gun communication. To fire as
a battery, the platoons must perform a laborious manual coordination proce-
dure, just as when multiple batteries are coordinated to fire as a massed bat-
talion. This coordination comes at the high cost of time (i.e., loss of
responsiveness).
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3. Battery leadership responsibilities. The Battery Commander and the First
Sergeant, the two senior personnel of the battery, no longer have clearly de-
fined roles, and often find themselves separated from the battery for long pe-
riods of time, and at critical moments. In battle, these two are the critical links
in knowing the tactical scenario, and their absence arguably degrades the unit's
tactical capability. Other battery leadership positions are affected as well.
4. Human factors Issues of automated fire control. Under 3x6, the battalion Fire
Direction Center was respoasible for maintaining and processing message
traffic for three units (the three batteries). Additionally, in warfare conditions,
it is very likely that a reinforcing battalion will also be under total control of
the Direct Support battalion's FDC. On top of this, standard doctrine of
"mutual support" requires that databases be maintained and updated for one
or possibly two sister battalions in neighboring sectors. Meeting all these re-
quirements for batteries in a fast-paced battle is quite a task. Double the
number of units in each battalion (when platoons are autonomous), and the
workload explodes. There are multiple functions associated with a "unit"
identified in the computer, so the workload vs. the number of "units" is cer-
tainly not a linear relationship. When batteries operate as autonomous
platoons, it is necessary for each platoon to be entered into the computer's
database as a separate unit. It can be argued that just the workload of six
units (platoons), alone, overloads the capability of the computer-to-human
interface (i.e., overloads the input/output capability of the operators). If so, the
battalion's tactical operations are degraded without even including the de-
mands of mutual support.
5. JMEMs arguments. Concern has been expressed that the Joint Munitions
Effects Manual (J.NlEMs) tables are not accurate for current munitions, par-
ticularly Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM). Some argue that four
guns shooting ICM is just as effective as the previous six guns shooting High
Explosive; i.e, platoon oper.,, ions are justified, and desirable.
All of these factors have been argued from both sides. The point is that there are
many factors which could account for what was going wrong. Unfortunately, most of
these are not suitable for quantitative analysis, until the problem issue is much better
refined. It is possible that each of these factors contributes to the degraded performance.
More likely, there are interactions between all the factors.
It is interesting to note that many of the units which were being scolded by NTC
observers for running platoon operations actually thought they were employing battery
fires. This misconception is due to the way fire missions are processed: the battalion
FDC computer operator allocates a particular fire mission to a battery. But in sending
the mission down to autonomous platoons (via FM radio), each platoon must be con-
tacted separately. This is done by the computer automatically, completely transparent
to the operator. Since each platoor is receiving its own fire order, each executes the
mission irmediately, but not necessarily simultaneously with its sister platoon. The
misperception is that the battalion fire direction operator thinks he has executed a bat.
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tery mission, whereas he has actually generated two identical platoon missions. A subtle
difference, yet very significant. Thus, not only was there conflicting opinion about tac-
tical employment procedures, but the misperceptions of what was actually being exe-
cuted compounded the problem further.
C. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF NTC
There are two distinct types of training environments at the National Training
Center: Force-on-force and Livefire. In the force-on-force environment, the training
unit is opposed by a real enemy, the Opposing Forces (OPFOR), who look, train, and
are equipped like a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment. Obviously, real ammunition is not
used in this phase. Rather, all direct fire systems (rifles and tanks, for example) are
equipped with laser-beam firing simulation systems. Likewise, all personnel and vehicles
are equipped with laser detection sets, which signal a "kill" when the person or vehicle
is engaged by an appropriate opposing system.
In the Livefire environment, on the other hand, live ammunition is used. but the
OPFOR is simulated through the us,. of a vast array of pop-up targets. These targets
are full-size silhouette panels represeating Soviet armored vehicles. The synchronized
presentation of the pop-up silhouettes provides an amazingly realistic effect of a mobile
enemy. Because of this extensive, semi-permanent target array, Livefire battles are re-
stricted to the one particular "corridor" which contains all of the targets. Force-on-force
battles are conducted on other regions of the NTC reservation.
D. CURRENT COMBAT MODEL SHORTFALLS
One of the shortfalls of combat training, even at the National Training Center, is
that a combat environment cannot be perfectly replicated. This shortfall is more pro-
nounced in the arena of indirect (i.e., artillery) fire than with direct fire systems. With
regard to both the Force-on-force and Livefire environments at the NTC, the direct fire
systems (tank, rifles, and machine guns) are fairly well represented in lethality effects by
the laser-beam instrumentation systems. But there is very little realization of actual ar-
tillery effects in a training environment. Even at the NTC Livefire range, where all
combat systems fire live ammunition, the effects of artillery are not fully realized, either
by the troops on the ground or by the automated instrumentation system.
This is not to say that it is not good training. The opportunity to coordinate and
fire actual artillery rounds at a moving target is a valuable experience. But the effects
are not captured, even at the NTC. That is, there is no credible measure of how the
artillery as a whole impacted upon the outcome of the battle.
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In the Force-on-force environment, (as well as in computer combat simulation
models), there is an equally unrealistic factor: artillery is too perfectly played. There
are no timing errors, no confused communications, no maintenance or logistic error, and
certainly no misfires. Much of the reality, and challenge, of the real world is assumed
away. This real world chaos, the "fog of war, is extremely important in shaping battle.
It can cause a near perfect plan to become worthless in a matter of seconds (literally),
because timing is critically important in a highly fluid combat situation. The inability
to model confusion in simulation is a significant shortfall of most battle analyses.
E. THE IMPLIED HYPOTHESIS TEST
At this point, a review of the facts is in order. First, as far as NTC is concerned,
there is a problem with the employment of 3x8. Many Army agencies, as well as high
ranking individuals, are interested in getting some analyses and results. Secondly, the
transitions to 3x8 are now complete in all active divisions, and no one is keen about yet
another force structure change so soon, Thirdly, Legal Mix V already conclusively
supports 3x8 employment, but it does so within a specific set of parameters. The mix
actually supported by the report [Ref. 3, p. 51 was the one in which the two platoons
were operating independently, but with simultaneous fires, i.e., operating under unifled
battery fire control. Therefore, the current usage of autonomous platoons is not really
within the context of the Legal Mix V supporting argument.
Given that the transition to 3x8 has already been made, the interest is not in whether
the transition was right or wrong, nor is it in looking for yet another, improved, force
structure. Rather, the focus of attention is on how to get the best results with the al-
ready existent 3x8 organization. It is within this context that the theme of massed fires
has been constantly reiterated by the NTC observers. It is continually suggested that if
units would fire missions as a battery instead of as platoons, much greater effects could
be realized. This statement is, in fact, the "party line" for the NIC Artillery Observation
Team, and the motivation for this research.
NTC artillery observers collected and analyzed data, and generated conscientious
proposals for corrective action in many areas of concern. But they do not have the re-
sources available to check their primary premise, which is that "3x8 can work better if
the units are firing as batteries. They are certain that all other factors are secondary to
the fact that eight guns, fired simultaneously, give better battlefield effects than two
groups of four fired independently.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
A. THE NECESSITY FOR A NEW APPROACH
It is desired to make a direct comparison between what is real (3x8 "autonomous"
platoons), vs. what is exhorted as being better (3x8 battery operations). It is known that
the battles conducted at NTC provide one of the most accurate insights to actual com-
mand, control and communication (C3) dynamics in a combat environment. Also, it is
a fact that validated combat simulation models provide plausible, reproducible lethality
assessments.
A new approach was devised, which exploits the strengths of these two proven
methods, to form a credible model for use in making a comparison. The methodology
does not deny C3 interactions through assumption, but rather, captures the C3 realities
of the NTC, holding them constant as with the other interrelated factors.
B. A NEW APPROACH
The methodology proposed here is to model the NTC Livefire OPFOR target array
in a combat simulation model, and recreate the training units' actual artillery battles as
recorded on the NTC fire mission worksheets. Because the combat simulation model
provides valid information on the effects of fires (combat kills, for example), this pro-
vides a "base case" evaluation of the effects of the units' actual platoon fires, whether
intentionally or circumstantially autonomous. A second (comparative) case is con-
structed by using the same fire mission workshcets, but restricting all fires to battery
level missions, The result is two sets of fire effects data: one in which the fire missions
were executed within the combat simulation exactly as they had been conducted at the
NTC Livefire, and the other based upon the same firing data but being restricted to
battery fires.
To implement this approach, a high-resolution combat simulation model was re-
quired. Janus was chosen for this role, for the following reasons:
I. Validity. Janus has been approved for use by the US Army, and is the model
of choice for high-resolution combat simulation.
2. Capability. Janus allows the modeling of both realistic maneuver forces and
realistic artillery fires. Its resolution allows a combat force to be represented
down to the individual vehicles, with a planned movement route fbr cach. This
degree of resolution is necessary for the proposed avproach.
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The position which is stated time and again by the NTC Artillery Observation Team
personnel is summarized as follows:
... [The 3x8 units] would have greater effect if, [instead of trying to engage multiple
targets with platoon fires], they would just pick one target and shoot the entire
battery .... [Ref. 51
The analysis suggested by this statement is a direct comparison of what is actually
being done (implicitly caused by the new force structure), versus what the outcome could
be if the batteries were required to shoot as a cohesive unit. Quantitative analysis,
therefore, should be addressed to the comparison of 3x8 artillery effects under two dif-
fering methods of fires.
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3. Availability. The current Janus version is in use and is maintained by the US
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Command cell
at Monterey (TRAC-MTRY), which is co-located with the Naval Postgrad-
uate School. so it was readily available for use with this research. Additionally,
TRAC-MTRY has personnel who can provide expertise and experience for the
model and its implementation.
4. Artillery algorithms. The Janus algorithms, in particular ICM, are considered
adequate for lethality assessment in this type of scenario [Ref. 6].
C. CONSTRUCTING THE OPFOR IN JANUS
The Livefire OPFOR target array replicates a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment,
consisting of two Motorized Rifle Battalions. The targets represent 114 armored vehi-
cles, predominantly BMP armored personnel carriers. Other vehicles include T-72 tanks,
BRDM armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, and armored air defense sys-
tems. The OPFOR target array presented against a rotational training unit in a defen-
sive scenario was standardized and automated'. In the hour before attack time, small
groups of distant targets are raised to indicate the impending attack. At 1l-hour, the
computerized control system begins automatically raising and lowering belts of target
panels in order to replicate steady movement of an enemy (at 18 kilometers per hour in
daytime, 12 at night). This automated, standardized OPFOR scenario was exploited in
the analysis methodologv employed here.
Within the target array, each OPFOR vehicle is represented by a series of pop-up
target panels from one end of the battlefield to the other. That is, within each target
belt, there is a specific target corresponding to a particular vehicle (weapon system),
which corresponds to the same vehicle in preceding and subsequent belts. Thus, the
replicated OPFOR unit maintains a spatial relationship consistent with an advancing
motorized rifle regiment, throughout the course of the attack.
Each of the OPFOR vehicles represented by the target array was entered into the
Janus model by representative vehicle type, and assigned a movement route corre-
sponding to its particular series of target panels. Data for the exact locations and types
of each target panel within the target array was provided by the NTC Livefire Team.
Each individual pop-up target location was represented in Janus as a route "node" for
the corresponding vehicle. Thus the movement plan for the vehicles in Janus directly
corresponded to the "movement" of the simulated OPFOR units. Some nodes, partic-
ularly the first few for each vehicle, were later designated as "timed nodes" within Janus
5 Due to a recent hardware upgrade, the scenarios since July 190 now incorporate some
randomness in target presentation, and can no longer be considered standardized.
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to coordinate the timing, keeping all of the vehicles on line with one other. Execution
of the final movement plan was closely scrutinized to ensure the Janus representation
exactly matched the actual NTC battle movement.
D. PROGRAMMING THE ARTILLERY MISSIONS
Data for the training units' (BLUEFOR) artillery fires were obtained from the fire
mission worksheets which are maintained by the NTC Artillery Observation Team dur-
ing each battle. These worksheets are manual records of the actual fire missions trans-
mitted by the fire direction computer and executed by the firing units. A random sample
of worksheets was collected for Livefire deliberate defense scenarios conducted at the
NTC during the period May 1989 to April 1990. Only Livefire battles were considered,
in order to capture command, control, and communication (C3) interactions in the
analysis. The sceriario type was restricted to deliberate defens's (as opposed to offense
and hasty defense) because, due to their standardization, they could be plausibly re-
created. From these worksheets, ten scenarios were ultimately chosen for use, based
upon criteria of legibility and completeness of data. All missions were programmed with
Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM)6. since this is the primary
projectile for use against an armored threat, and is the only munition capable of killing
armor systems.
Having collected the data, two cases were generated for each scenario, for input into
Janus:
1. Case 1: Platoon missions (Base Case)
The fire mission worksheets contained the time, grid location, firing unit, and
total number of rounds fired for each target andor fire mission. These missions were
entered exactly into Janus, paying particular attention to the total number of rounds,
which was converted into number of volleys for Janus input. The timing of the battle
was accomplished by establishing the H-hour of the actual battle from the fire mission
worksheet, and coordinating this with the Janus OPFOR movement timing. lI-hour was
usually apparent from the targeting sequence. Whenever there was doubt, the judgment
was always in favor of the BLUEFOR; that is, for establishing the scenarios, the model
was biased towards "BEST CASE" effects. This does not bias the comparison, however,
6 A sub.group of Improved Conventional Munitions; DPICM rounds deploy bomblets ca-
pable of defeating light and medium armored vehicles (given a bomblet direct hit)., At piesent, this
is the only "dumb" artillery munition capable of defeating armor.
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for the identical timing sequence was used for the alternate case (Case 2) of each sce-
nario.
2. Case 2: Battery missions
In constructing the alternate case for each of the ten scenarios, in which the fire
missions would be conducted as battery missions, it was imperative to: (1) maintain the
integrity of the fire mission timing, (2) maintain the same number of total rounds fired,
per mission and per battle, and (3) not introduce bias in target selection. To accomplish
this, a procedure was established which was a fair treatment of converting platoon fires
to battery fires. In the few cases where the units had fired as batteries, no changes were
made. Otherwise, each platoon fire mission was evaluated, in sequence, to determine if,
at the time of execution, the sister platoon was in a conflicting fire mission ("conflicting"
meaning that the sister platoon had a mission whose execution window overlapped the
mission being considered), preventing it from being available to join the mission. The
two possible situations were treated as follows:
No conflict: Schedule a battery fire mission with exactly the same number of total
rounds as used for the platoon fire mission.
Conflict: Perform a random selection ("coin flip"), schedule the winner as a battery
mission, keeping the total number of rounds fired the same as if both missions had
been executed.
During. the discussion of statistical analysis, these two cases of artillery imple-
mentation are refered to as "treatments," since each is actually a treatment factor for
each scenario.
E. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
The Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) used for this evaluation is kills. This is very
simplistic, yet applicable within the context of the evaluation. Suppression is not
measured, because there is no adequate "yardstick." Suppression is very difficult to play
in a combat simulation, including at the NTC, and impossible to measure with current
methods. It is therefore treated as a lesser included effect of kills, i.e., a measured dif-
ference in effectiveness by "kills" would have applicability to suppression effects, in terms
of relative significance. Furthermore, in NTC vernacular, weapon system "effectiveness"
has the underlying implication of "kills", even in artillery contexts.
Secondly, this is a comparative analysis. Any reasonable Measure of Effectiveness
should suffice, as long as it is applied equally to all cases. Due to the difficulty of
quantifRing suppression, the "Kills" MOE serves as a plausible, though perhaps not rig-
orous, surrogate for many battle effects.
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V. RESULTS AND STATISTICAL DATA ANALYSIS
A. MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS
The model to be used is:
yrk= + &I + fij + 2I? +&Vk
where
=- kills in the kth run, ith scenario, jth treatment,
= grand mean,
a, = effect of scenario i,
fl = effect of treatment j,
a#,, = effect of interaction, and
C,,, = random error.
Here, i= 1,2,...,10; j= 1,2; k= 1,2,...,80.
The hypothesis to be tested is whether there exists a significant difference between
treatments. It is anticipated that there could be vast discrepancies between scenarios,
since each scenario incorporates numerous exogenous factors which influence the overall
results of the battle. The intention is to treat the scenarios as a "nuisance" factor, since
there probably will be a significant difference between scenarios. The hypotheses under
test are formally defined as:
110: P1  P2,
B. SIMULATION RUNS
There were a total of 20 different situations for evaluation: ten scenarios with two
treatments each. Due to time constraints, each was initially run 40 times in Janus
systemic processing mode. As more time became available, an additional 40 runs were
made for each situation, independent of the first set.
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The results of the battle simulation runs are summarized in Table 2 on page 17.
The sample mean and sample standard deviation for each of the situations is shown,
computed from the 80 values of "kills" for each cell. It can be seen that in some sce-
narios Case 2 appears to be superior to Case 1, but in others the reverse is true. So there
is no clear "winner'. Further inspection reveals that, in both Case I and Case 2, there
is a large discrepancy between the means obtained for different scenarios. Within a
particular scenario, however, the two treatments are fairly close in outcomes. So con-
trasts between scenarios are expected to be highly significant. This is not surprising,
considering what these numbers represent. Each of the scenarios is distinctly different,
in regard to each units' tactical plan, execution capability, level of training, the weather
and environmental conditions, and numerous other factors. Proper analysis of treatment
effects will require appropriately addressing this difference between scenarios.
Table 2. JANUS RESULTS
Case I Case 2
Scenario Sample Sample Sample Sample
Number Mean Standard Mean Standard
(Kills) Deviation (Kills) Deviation
! 1.313 1.259 1.412 1.177
2 1.075 1.474 1.262 1.338
3 1.075 0.868 0.525 0.675
4 0.800 0.770 0.850 0.901
5 0.263 0.568 0.537 0.762
6 0.088 0.284 0.087 0.284
7 1.475 1.067 0.187 0.424
8 3.813 1.936 3.125 1.169
9 2.288 1.443 1.212 0.964
10 0.725 0.842 0.675 0.792
C. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Figure Figure 3 on page 18 graphically depicts the differences in means between the
various scenarios. As expected, each outcome appears to be dependent upon the sce-
nario. As mentioned, the means for the two treatments within each scenario generally
have similar magnitudes. (The same data, re-ordered by the difference of means between
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Treatment 2 and Treatment 1, is shown in Figure 12 on page 28, in connection with
discussion of scenarioxtreatment interactions.)
COMPARISON OF MEANS: CASE 1 VS. CASE 2
2 3 4 6 6 7 II 9 10
SCENARIO NUMBER
Figure 3. Comparison of Scenarios vs. Treatments: (Scenario numbering random;
point symbol indicates the trcatment number)
The SAS statistical analysis software package was used for analysis. A preliminary
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test, according to the stated model, yielded the results
summarized in Figure 4 on page 19. Predictably, this test indicates a high significance
of the interaction between scenarios and treatments. Overall generalizations about the
outcomes with each treatment cannot be made at this point.
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GENERAL LINEAR MODELS PROCEDURE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: KILLS
SOURCE DF SUM OF SQUARES MEAN SQUARE F VALUE PR > F
MODEL 19 1429.30687500 75.22667763 66.68 0.0
ERROR 1580 1782.61250000 1.12823576 ROOT MSE
CORRECTED TOTAL 1599 3211.91937500 1.06218443
SOURCE DF TYPE IV SS F VALUE PR > F
SCENARIO 9 1280.73812500 126.13 0.0
TREATMNT 1 36.90562500 32.71 0.0001
SCENARIOTREATMNT 9 111.66312500 11.00 0.0001
Figure 4. Initial ANOVA
A plot of the residuals 7 (Figure 5 on page 20) suggests that the ANOVA assump-
tion of homogeneity of variance may not be satisfied with these data. In the figure, the
plot on the left shows the discreteness of the data; over 98% of the data points are hid-
den. To get a better view, the data were jitteredR, resulting in the plot on the right. This
plot, along with a plot of sample means versus sample standard deviations (Figure 6 on
page 21). suggests that standard deviations may be proportional to means. This suggests
that a logarithmric transform may be appropriate to stabilize the variance.
7 the difference between the observed value, and the value predicted by the model (YIIAT)
8 The jitter was obtained by applying a random value from the interval (0.5, 0.5) to both the
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Figure 5. Residual plots, ANOVA mith dependent variable KILLS
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MEANS VS. STANIDARD DEVATIONS
"Y V
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SAMLddE MEAN
Figure 6. Means vs. Standard Deviations for Janus KILLS data
A logarithmic transform was performed on the "kills" data. Because several of the
values are zero, the following was the actual transform used:
LOGKILL = In (KILLS + 0.5)
After conducting ANOVA on these values, the residuals were plotted (Figure 7 on page
22). This plot suggests the homogeneity of variance assumption is tenable for the
LOGKILL data. The plot also shows clearly that the LOGKILL responses are discrete.
Thus, technically, the normality of residuals assumption of ANOVA is not satisfied
[Ref. 7]. However, the calculated significance values in ANOVA have been shown to






Figure 7. Residual plots, ANOVA ii ith dependent variable LOGKI LLS
Again, the ANOVA results with the transformed data (Figure 8 on page 23) indicate
a str-ong significance of scenario xtreatment interaction. These interaction eff'ects have
to be accounted for before a meaningful comparison of treatment effects can be made.
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GENERAL LINEAR MODELS PROCEDURE
DEPENDENT VARIABLEs LOGKILL
SOURCE DF SUM OF SQUARES MEAN SQUARE F VALUE PR > F
MODEL 19 229.41961937 12.07471681 61.81 0.0
ERROR 1580 308.67656699 0.19536492 ROOT MSE
CORRECTED T9TAL 1599 538.09618636 0.44200104
SOURCE DF TYPE IV SS F VALUE PR > F
SCENARIO 9 198.76613342 113.05 0.0
TREATMNT 1 5.25035068 26.87 0.0001
SCENARIO*TREATMNT 9 25.40313528 14.45 0.0001
Figure 8. ANOVA with LOGKILLS
D. FURTHER ANALYSIS
In order to accommodate the scenarioxtreatment interactions, and yet be able to
test the hypothesis of no difference due to treatments, a Scheflb contrast procedure was
conducted on the differences between treatments for each scenario (y,2, -y,,). The
Scheffe procedure can be used to define groups of the "nuisance" factor (i.e., scenarios)
which have similar levels of effect. Applied to differences between treatments, the
Schcffc procedure suggests separating the scenarios into two distinct groups (Figure 9
on page 24). From these results, it was decided to define Group A as the six scenarios
5, 2, 1. 4, 6, and 10, and Group B as the remaining four scenarios, 3, 8, 9, and 7. Further
ANOVA tests were next performed on these two sets of data, with the expectation that
interaction effects would be less pronounced within each group.
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SCHEFFE'S TEST FOR VARIABLE: KILLD
NOTE: THIS TEST CONTROLS THE TYPE I EXPERIMENTWISE ERROR RATE
BUT GENERALLY HAS A HIGHER TYPE II ERROR RATE THAN REGWF
FOR ALL PAIRWISE COMPARISONS
ALPHA=O.05 DF=790 MSE=2.28843
CRITICAL VALUE OF F=1.89171
MINIMUM SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE=.98693
MEANS WITH THE SAME LETTER ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT.
SCHEFFE GROUPING MEAN N SCENARIO
A 0.2750 80 5
A
A 0.1875 80 2
A
A 0.1000 80 1
A
A 0.0500 80 4
A
A 0.0000 80 6
A
A -0.0500 80 10
A
B A -0,5500 80 3
B A
B A -0.6875 80 8
B
B -1.0750 80 9
B
B -1 .2875 80 7
Figure 9. Scheffe Test results, output from SAS procedure GLM
The ANOVA of LOGKILL for data in Group A (Figure 10 on page 25) indicates
that the interaction is not significant for these data. Thus, the results can now be gen-
eralized over scenarios in Group A. The high F-value for treatments indicates that there
is a significant difference in LOGKILL outcomes, due to the treatments. This F-value
is sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of no diffierence in treatment effects, for Group
A scenarios. Since the mean differences y,2 -j ,, flor the scenarios i = 5, 2, 1, 4, 6 are
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non-negative, it is concluded that LOGKILLS is significantly larger for missions con-
ducted as batteries than for missions conducted as platoons. This surgests the same
conclusion for treatment effects with KILLS.
GENERAL LINEAR MODELS PROCEDURE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE F LOGKILL
SOURCE DF SUM OF SQUARES MEAN SQUARE F VALUE PR > F
MODEL 11 48.98187676 4.4S289789 22.25 0.0001
ERROR 948 189.73426461 0.20014163 ROOT MSE
CORRECTED TOTAL 959 238.71614137 0.44737191
SOURCE DF TYPE IV SS F VALUE PR > F
SCENARIO 5 46.83076707 46.80 0.0001
TREAThNT 1 0.84430472 4.22 0.0403
SCENARIOITREATMNT 5 1.30680498 1.31 0.2591
Figure 10. ANOVA on sub-group A (scenarios 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, & 10)
The ANOVA results for Group B, however, are not as definitive. (Figure 11). The
significance of the treatments here is also very strong, but it is clouded by the interaction
between scenario and treatment. Interpretations about the difference between treat-
ments in this group must be made with care.
GENERAL LINEAR MODELS PROCEDURE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOGKILL
SOURCE DF SUM OF SQUARES MEAN SQUARE F VALUE PR > F
MODEL 7 123.53830122 17.64832875 93.77 0.0
ERROR 632 118.94230238 0.18819985 ROOT MSE
CORRECTED TOTAL 639 242.48060359 0.43382006
SOURCE DF TYPE IV SS F VALUE PR ) F
SCENARIO 3 95.03592496 168.32 0.0
TREATMNT 1 22.54668462 119.80 0.0001
SCENARIOxTREATMNT 3 5.95569164 10.55 0.0001
Figure 11. ANOVA on sub-group B (scenarios 3, 7, 8, & 9)
The nature of the interaction for Group B scenarios can be seen in Figure 12 on
page 28. There is not a "cross-over" in treatment means for scenarios in this group.
25
Rather, there is a "wedge-shape" increasing difference between these means, as scenarios
range over 3, 8, 9, and 7. In all these scenarios, the Treatment I mean is greater than
the Treatment 2 mean (i.e.,., -. ,, < 0, for i = 3, 8, 9, 7). It is thus reasonable to con-




A. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
The Scheffe procedure provided a categorization of scenarios, based upon the dif-
ferences in LOGKILL between treatments. A positive mean difference suggests that
Case 2 (batteries) was better than Case I (platoons); a negative value suggests the op-
posite. As seen in the previous chapter, the Scheffe contrast method applied to the dif-
ference data suggested two groups. Group A contains all of the scenarios in which the
mean difference was positive (Case 2 superior) plus one [very small] negative value.
These data were sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of no difference due to treatment
effects. That is, in these scenarios (Group A), there appears to be a significant advan-
tage with eight-gun batteries.
Group B was comprised of scenarios 3, 7, 8 and 9, all of which have negative dif-
ferences of means (Case I is superior). Although the ANOVA for this group, alone,
indicates there is still significant scenarioxtreatment interaction, it is possible to make
an overall conclusion about treatment eflicts for these fur scenarios. The plotted
sample means in Figure 12 on page 28 support the reasoning that these four scenarios
all have corresponding population mean diflerences less than zero. This implies that, for
Group B scenarios, there is an advantage in firing as four-gun platoons.
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COMPARISON OF MEANS: CASE 1 VS. CASE2
SCENAO NUMBER
Figure 12. Comparison of Means: Scenarios ordered by decreasing difference in
means.
B. COMMONALITY WITHIN SCENARIO GROUPS
In attempting to account for the different effects of treatments between the scenar-
ios of Group B and those of Group A, several possible factors were evaluated, as shown
in Table 3 on page 29. There are no simple, outstanding commonalities (recognizing
that this is a subjective grading scheme). But one factor which does appear to be con-
sistent and distinct among Group B scenarios is the volume of fire during tile simulated
battle. It seems that those scenarios which had a higher volume of fires9 produced larger
mean kills in Case I than in Case 2. But why?
9 volume of fires was the same for both cases within a given scenario
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Table 3. COMPARISON OF SCENARIOS: (Group A normal. Group B italics)
Scenario Time of No. of No. of Volume of Accuracy
Day missions rounds fires and/or
fired (apprux) Timing
* 5 night avg 192 mixed poor
2 day few 108 high good
I night many I(K low very good
4 day few I 20 mixed good
6 day few 150 low poor-fair
Io day many iSO mixed fair
3 night (I_._ _ 240 high puor
,_ ni.,, manti" 251) high .fatr-gond
9 2'o)ht "fi/ __h tgh _ir
7 dan" avg 173 high poor
A possible explanation is this: With platoon rnissions, the smaller firing elements
create a greater "variance" of fires. Note that the Group B scenatios also all had poor
to fair accuracy of fires. So, with twice as many platoons engaging more "'targets"10 than
batteries could, a greater "coverage" of fires is created, both over area and over time.
Because the targets are rapidly moving, the larger area of coverage actually increases the
probability of an artillery hit, even though the concentration of rounds per unit area has
decreased. But this effect is only realized in the larger volumes of fire, perhaps because
at lower volumes the total number of rounds is too low to have an advantage either way.
Anai' sis of Group A scenarios reveals the following trend: massed fires (i.e., battery
missions) were generally more effective when more accurate target intelligence (location
and timing) was available (as indicated by the accuracy, timing of a unit's fires). A cor-
responding lack of target intelligence gave an advantage to platoon fires. This makes
intuitive sense, since massed fires can only kill a target if there is a target hit. Conversely,
if the target location is vague, the area coverage provided by platoon fires yields a higher
expected outcome, since the randomness increases the probability of a hit. This is ex-
actly why massed fires are most eflective against stationary, point targets; they are not
necessarily so effective against moving, armored targets.




The results of analysis indicate that, statistically, there is a significant difference in
whether artillery is employed as batteries or as platoons. But the advantage, in terms of
kills, can go either way, depending upon the scenario. I lowever, in determining the op-
erational significance of these results, the numbers must be put into an operational con-
text. In most scenarios, the actual difference in outcomes between cases was in terms
of fractions of a kill. In all scenarios and treatments, the number of kills compared to
the number of enemy forces (over 100) is very low. The statistical significance of the
output data is therefore overshadowed by the fact that these differences have very little
impact upon the actual outcome of the battle. It is therefore suggested that the diff r-
ence in battlefield effects of artillery, merely as a function of battery vs. platoon oper-
ations, is negligible.
Also, as mentioned earlier, the effects of suppression hae not been specifically ad-
dressed by this research. It has been assumed that implications derived from the analysis
of "kills" can be applied to suppressive effects as well. Recognition should be given,
however, to the fact that suppression is, in itself, a significant role of artillery, partic-
ularly for a direct support battalion in a deliberate defense scenario, against an armored
threat. Suppression effects have unique qualities of their own, and can be used not only
to influence "kills," but also to influence the tactical play of the battle. It can be used
to influence enemy maneuver as well as to suppress enemy artillery. The results dis-
cussed in this analysis are valid for some aspects of suppression, but the value of sup-
pression is likely to be much greater than indicated by the MOE of "kills". But just as
with "kills", the results of this study indicate that the effects of suppression are not as
dependent upon battery vs. platoon operations, as much as they are on other, scenario-
driven factors.
The bottom line for the statistical analysis is that differences in effects are incurred
due to the chosen method of employment, but whether the effects increase or decrease
depends upon the scenario. In the model used for this research, the "scenario" includes
not only environmental factors surrounding the battle, but also all of the intangible,
unit-oriented factors such as level of training, unit proficiency, commander's intent, level
of execution, command and control, communications, and innumerable others. The
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implication of the results is that the supposed decreases in artillery effectiveness which
have been observed by the NTC personnel must be caused by factors other than just the
firing unit size. Perhaps the causes for decreased observed effects arc related to the 3x8
force structure, but it does not appear to be because of the inherent properties of four
guns versus eight. Further analysis should focus on other factors surrounding this issue,
such as training, leadership, and command and control.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research could be applied towards other aspects of the 3x8 controversy.
One of the many issues which surfaced during this research was that of equipment
breakdown, and the subsequent ramifications upon artillery units' effectiveness. Con-
sidering the reality of situations in which one or two howitzers may be unavailable for
fires at a particular time, the impact upon effectiveness could be significant.
It is doubtful that further analysis with this same methodology will yield new in-
sights. The scenarios collected for this research represent an adequate sampling of the
battles which have been conducted over the stated period. Further data collection has
little potential for new results. Further, because of an upgrade in the livefire automation
system the battle scenarios are no longer standardized as they were previously. There-
fore, further research and analysis with this particular methodology is not recommended.
Currently, at the Field Artillery School and Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, research
is being done to update the weapons effects tables for current munitions. Such data has
not been verified in over 30 years. The results of these analyses could provide a new
database of JMEMs data, which would justify a further analysis of optimal battery size
for direct support battalions.
C. CONCLUSION
The level of battlefield effectiveness achieved by artillery is influenced by the factor
of how the battery is employed, but whether the advantage lies in battery fires or in
platoon fires is stringently dependent upon the scenario. People who are very close to
the 3x8 controversy may not be comfortable with these results. But the results should
not be ignored. "Scenario," in the usage of this methodology, includes many factors
which may be a direct result of the way 3x8 has been implemented, so the 3x8 issue still
needs tough scrutiny. The research presented here does not refute the observations of
personnel at the National Training Center, but does provide a basis for declaring the
argument that "eight is inherently better than four" as insubstantial. The findings are
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that other, scenario related factors dominate the issue of 3x8 battlefield effectiveness,
and that is where attention should be focused.
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